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Abstract 
 
This policy paper focuses on the incentive framework for Pakistani agriculture, with 
emphasis on trade and price policies. It first presents a synthesis of major trends in the 
performance of the sector and analyzes Pakistan’s extraordinarily complex, opaque and 
discretionary, and continually-changing trade regime. It presents a disaggregated analysis of 
the border measures for the selected products (trade and price interventions vary by product), 
and estimates the joint effect of trade and procurement policies on farm prices, captured by 
direct price comparison. It concludes by providing policy recommendations emphasizing on 
the revision of trade regime to eliminate quantitative restrictions and to modify tariffs in the 
direction of greater equality, a positive, moderate and uniform tariff on imports across the 
board as the only border measure for import competing products.  
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Executive Summary 
 
1. This paper focuses on the incentive framework for Pakistani agriculture, with 
emphasis on trade and price policies. The direct and indirect impacts of such policies are 
often underappreciated. Possible trade and price policies reforms, in the context of a highly 
tradable activity such as agriculture, by altering returns, would likely affect the performance 
of the whole sector by influencing the returns on infrastructure and other investments; and 
this in turn would have impact on factor markets, such as for labor, land and water. Changes 
to the incentive structure due to changes in trade and price policies certainly would more 
directly affect the reallocation of labor, land and water to higher valued uses.  
 
2. The paper first presents a synthesis of the major trends in the performance of the 
sector, providing a broader context in which to view the functioning of agricultural trade and 
price policies. It then turns to Pakistan’s extraordinarily complex, opaque and discretionary, 
and continually-changing trade regime. There are also direct interventions by parastatals in 
procurement and sales price determination for the major crops. The paper presents a 
disaggregated analysis of the border measures for the selected products (trade and price 
interventions vary by product), and estimates the joint effect of trade and procurement 
policies on farm prices, captured by direct price comparison. 
 
3. Despite certain loss in dynamism, agriculture remains central to Pakistan’s 
development and growth. About two-thirds of Pakistan’s population resides in rural areas, 
depending mainly on agriculture for household livelihoods. Agriculture contributes 
approximately 21 percent of Pakistan’s national GDP, employing 45 percent of the total labor 
force. The decline in the agricultural share has occurred in spite of significant growth in 
agricultural output (see below). The sector contributes to around 80 percent of export 
earnings directly and indirectly through forward linkages to agro-based industries (i.e. 
textiles). Labor productivity in agriculture is below the average for the rest of the economy. 
The sector's labor share is much greater than its share in national value added implying that 
value added per worker in agriculture is very low. This observation further supports the 
policy recommendation of reducing overall protection of tradable inputs for agriculture 
(reflected in the negative ERPs faced by some crops). 
 
4. Agricultural growth affects both rural and urban economic growth. Beyond the farm 
gate, Pakistan’s agriculture is a major source of raw materials for the manufacturing 
industry, contributing over 50 percent of basic inputs to downstream industries. On the 
demand side, the sector is a large market for industrial products such as fertilizers, 
pesticides, machinery and equipment. 
 
5. Over the last two decades, there has been a structural shift within agriculture. The 
crop sub-sector gradually declining from 65 percent of agricultural value added in 1990-91 to 
42 percent in 2010-11. Livestock’s share of agricultural value added increased from 30 to 55.1 
percent over this period. Fishing and forestry have remained steady, accounting for only 2.9 
percent. Together with livestock, cotton, wheat, sugarcane, and rice are the back bone of 
rural economy, and are sources of foreign exchange earnings for Pakistan. Currently wheat 
contributes about 2.7 percent of GDP, cotton 1.4 percent, rice 0.8 percent and sugarcane 0.9 
percent. About 50 percent of agricultural exports are due to cotton and 16 percent to rice,  
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6. Overall, the agricultural sector’s growth rate has declined gradually over the past 
three decades. Declining growth rates (see above) of 5.4 percent in the 1980s, 4.4 percent in 
the 1990s, and 3.2 percent in the 2000s are relatively high compared to many countries. The 
decline in output growth rates has been particularly pronounced in crops, in spite of higher 
world prices during the late 2000s. The reasons for this slowing of growth are due to several 
factors, including limited investment in irrigation systems, the slowing of the adoption of 
new technologies, a weak extension service, and perhaps the effect of changes to trade and 
price policies on agricultural investment. The availability of irrigation water is highly 
variable, and not increasing, although demand from agricultural production should be rising.  
 
7. Pakistan has been and remains both a net food importer and a net importer of 
agricultural goods, with a negative balance of sector trade. The largest agricultural import is 
vegetable oil; other major imported agricultural products include long staple cotton, 
fertilizers, sugar, pulses, tea, milk and milk products, and dry fruits. Although Pakistan is a 
net food importer, it would be unlikely that Pakistan would face a foreign exchange 
constraint in food imports given the low share of such imports relative to total export 
revenues and workers’ remittances. In 2010-11, total imports were US$ 40 billion, total 
exports US$ 25 billion and total remittances were approximately US$ 11 billion. Latest 
figures from Pakistan Bureau of Statistics show that Pakistan’s agricultural imports for 2010-
11 amounted to US$ 6 billion or about 16 percent of the total value of merchandise imports. 
 
8. For 2010-11, total agricultural imports amounted to approximately US$ 6 billion and 
total agricultural exports amounted to approximately US$ 4.8 billion, numbers that are 
small compared to the size of the larger economy and to the importance of the agricultural 
sector, which, given the size of the population, is mainly geared to the domestic market. 
There is a notable concentration of both imports and exports in very few products, sugar and 
palm oil making up almost 43 percent of all agricultural imports, and rice being by far the 
largest export item and generating nearly half of farm export earnings.  
 
9. Pakistan’s current agricultural trade and price regime is complex, opaque and hard to 
predict. By 2003 Pakistan’s trade liberalization (which had began in 1996) had simplified the 
tariff structure, nearly eliminating all quantitative restrictions, and lowering rates; and state 
trading monopolies had been abolished for agricultural products. But beginning in 2006, 
exceptions were introduced, and there was a reversal of a number of the more important 
liberalizing reforms in agriculture, notably related to wheat, sugar and fertilizer policies. In 
2008 the government introduced several Regulatory Duties, in addition to the expanded use 
of SROs–Statutory Regulatory Orders–which, since 2006, had been used both to give both 
partial (sometimes full) exemptions to normal tariffs, in some cases, and to increase tariffs, 
in others.  
 
10. Significant tariff exemptions are akin to vested interest. Most SROs are aimed at 
specific firms, not generally available for all importers, and they are primarily on inputs. 
These exemptions are yet another complication to a highly discretionary and continually 
changing trade regime, made all the more complex by preferential trade agreements (with 
China and other south Asian countries). In addition to the uncertainty produced by the trade 
regime’s discretionary nature, the complexity of various tariffs, regulatory duties, and SROs, 
generates a variety of dispersed price impacts across both products and inputs, which in turn 
lead to a higher dispersion of effective rates of protection—that is, the incentives for resource 
allocation. This is clear in the case of agriculture. 
Agriculture Trade and Price Policy in Pakistan 
4 
 
 
11. Thus, Pakistan’s import policy is deliberately complicated, with its large number of 
different tariffs and para-tariffs, while its high dispersion for specific products remains 
highly discretionary. It invites lobbying groups to attempt persuasion, with the risk of 
encouraging corruption. De facto, the current system of formal tariffs with SRO exemptions 
and regulatory duties, has become a mechanism of concessional rates and import licensing, 
something the member countries had agreed to remove under the GATT-WTO Uruguay 
Round Agreement. Trade preferences introduced by bilateral FTAs are a different matter, 
although they offer the risk of trade diversion and they contribute to a greater dispersion in 
total rates of protection from all sources of tariffs and taxes. 
 
12. A simple diagnostic of the trade regime based on tariff information would only tell 
part of the story with respect to the real impacts of trade policy on incentives. The varied 
profile of tariffs and para-tariffs—SROs, regulatory duties, tax withholdings, export bans, 
and subsidies on some exports and inputs—requires a deeper analysis at the product level 
that would capture the effects of the trade regime on returns. Indeed, the agricultural trade 
regime has six basic types of taxes: 
 
1. The Customs Duty (CD), the standard tariff assessed on an import’s CIF value. 
2. A Regulatory Duty (RD), a special Federal Government border tax, which is 
applicable to the CIF value, applicable in some cases to exports. 
3. The Federal Excise Duty, FED, and the Special FED on CIF value. 
4. The Provincial Excise Duty (PED) on CIF value. 
5. The Sales Tax (ST) on the duty paid value. 
6. The Withholding Tax (WHT) on duty and the sales tax paid value. 
 
13. In addition, there are various exemptions to taxes detailed by Special Regulatory 
Orders (SROs), which are particularly relevant for agriculture and discussed in the text. 
SROs are the mechanism by which the Pakistan executive via the Ministry of Commerce 
and/or the FBR can alter border taxes without recourse to the Parliament. SROs exempt 
many agricultural products, which are also exempt from sales taxes. On the export side, 
Pakistan has few restrictions to trade, the most important being bans on some “essential” 
products, ostensibly to ensure local availability; and the government requires official 
approval for exports in some cases. Export commodities are not subject to export taxes, with 
some exceptions subject to regulatory duties. 
 
14. Two measures of the effect of government policy on agricultural incentives widely 
used in the literature are the nominal and effective rates of protection (NRP and ERP). The 
NRP is the price received by producers relative to that price which would otherwise prevail in 
the absence of policy interventions. The nominal rate accounts only for effects on producers 
prices received for product sales. And so another measure has been developed to more 
closely reflect the effects of policy on net income, which is, after all, the basis of farmer 
welfare. The ERP is the per-ton net returns to farmers relative to those returns which would 
otherwise prevail in the absence of policy interventions. The relevant comparisons are made 
using observed border prices (fob for exports and cif for imports) and hypothetical prices to 
represent the non-intervention case.  
 
15. To determine the nominal rates of protection at the farmgate on the four products 
examined (wheat, rice, sugar and cotton, which represent approximately half of total farm 
production value), an estimate was made of the farmgate price of the product that would 
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have otherwise prevailed in the absence of interventions, such as tariffs, taxes and quotas at 
the border, and direct price intervention in domestic sales by state agencies. An NRP reflects 
output price distortions—relevant to buyers and consumers—but not the full effects of the 
policy mix on farmer income, because inventions might also influence input prices and costs, 
thereby affecting net farm returns.  
 
16. To estimate the effective rate of protection (ERP), one must account for the effects of 
the trade regime and other policies on costs (purchased inputs) as well as output price. 
Tradable inputs considered in this study are fertilizer, agrochemicals, seeds and equipment 
and machinery. NRPs for input prices were calculated and, in the case of fertilizer, adjusted 
upward by removing a significant subsidy. The Ministry of Finance notes that over the last 
four years the government has spent Rs. 110 billion on fertilizer subsidies and it was recently 
reported that the government had spent around Rs. 45 billion as fertilizer subsidy during last 
10 months of the current fiscal year aimed at boosting agriculture and achieving its targets.1 
For the tradable inputs, fertilizers were subsidized heavily, but other tradable inputs less so. 
For non-fertilizer inputs, the resulting hypothetical prices in the absence of the trade regime 
are lower in the order of 2% to 7%. Compared to the border price, the subsidy rate on 
fertilizer, however, is on the order of 35%, and, consequently, the costs per ton of production 
would increase considerably in the absence of intervention. Overall the ERPs for the four 
crops are negative, representing an implicit tax on farm income, although there are some 
exceptions for some years. 
 
 In the case of basmati rice, the implicit NRP on the product at the farm level was 
negative except for 2010-11. In 2010-11 there was a decrease in the implicit subsidy 
on tradable inputs, but a notable increase in the farmgate price. The negative ERPs 
for rice for the years 2008-09 and 2009-10 mean that farm income, as measure by 
value added would have been 40% higher in 2008-09 under a no-intervention policy 
and 21% higher in 2009-10. These implicit taxes should have had, all other things 
being equal, a significant impact in reducing basmati rice production.  
 
 For wheat, the ERP fluctuated from -20% to +13% to -23% over the three years 
examined, explained primarily by the swings in the implicit NRP on the product 
price, which was negative over the three years, but small in 2009-10. The implicit 
NRP on tradable input costs was negative (subsidizing farmers) and relatively stable 
compared to that on output price. In spite of the large volatility in border prices, both 
wholesale and farmgate wheat price appear to be relatively stable; which suggest that 
government interventions, through Federal procurement target of PASSCO and 
Provincial Food Departments, are absorbing the impacts on domestic prices of shocks 
to world prices. Such intervention has the effect of dampening the price transmission 
from border to domestic prices that would otherwise prevail in open markets. This 
price stabilization role is perhaps one reason that wheat stocks have risen in the 
recent past, which lately has led to exports at subsidized prices. The negative ERP in 
2008-09 accompanies a subsidy to consumers via the ‘issue price’ of wheat at which 
the government releases grain to flour mills. During 2008-09 the cost of imported 
wheat was about Rs 26,000 per ton (not including handling charges and other costs, 
including significantly storage) while the issue price was Rs 18,750. Even ignoring 
additional costs, the implicit subsidy to consumers (by selling at a price less than that 
                                                          
1Pakistan Today, 5 June 2012 
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based on imported wheat) was at least 28%. Including additional costs, the API 
estimates that the total subsidy to consumers merely on wheat during 2008-09 was 
Rs 50.3 billion, or approximately US$ 650 million. 
 
 The significant increase in the world price of refined sugar increases the import-
parity price, but the increase in the general sales tax applied to sugar offsets higher 
border prices. The NRP on sugarcane at the farmgate is negative and high—the 
import-parity prices are approximately double the observed farmgate price. Again, as 
in the case of other products considered, the decrease in tradable input costs in sugar 
production due to fertilizer subsidy more than offsets the increase due to tariffs. That 
is, tariffs on inputs increase production costs but fertilizer subsidies decrease 
production costs, such that the net effect is to reduce production costs. Despite the 
net subsidy on tradable inputs, the wedge driven between the import-parity price and 
farmgate price of the product sold results in a negative effective protection—thatis, an 
implicit tax on sugarcane production.  
 
 In the case of cotton, again the fertilizer subsidy dominates the NRP for tradable 
inputs, the cost of tradable inputs ranging from 10% to 20% less than what it would 
be in the absence of both the subsidy and the tariffs. Overall, the impact of 
interventions on cotton farmers’ income as measured by the ERP is highly volatile 
because the border price is volatile. As in the case of other products examined, the 
impact of trade regime and fertilizer subsidies on cotton reduces the negative impacts 
of the wedge between the farmgate price and the non-interventionist price that would 
otherwise prevail. That a large proportion of Pakistan’s cotton growers are small 
farms raises complex questions of the political economy of dealing with the efficient 
transmission of price signals in the context of such high price volatility. 
 
17. Specific policy recommendations on possible agricultural trade policy reforms: 
 
 The tariff schedule should be reformed to reduce dispersion and to remove the 
implicit tax on agriculture. The current tariff and duty system is not transparent, but 
complex, hard to understand and to interpret.   
 
 Pakistan should move toward a uniform and low tariff, with the tariff as the only 
border measure, no exceptions and no other taxes. A uniform tariff would not 
preclude sales taxes, as long as they are uniformly applied to imports and domestic 
production. Uniform tariffs, as the normal rule guiding trade policy, would not 
preclude the prudent and occasional use of transparent contingency measures, such 
as safeguards, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, which are all WTO legal. At 
the provincial level as well, taxes should not discriminate between domestic and 
foreign supplies.  
 
 Given the high volatility of wheat and sugar prices in world markets and the political 
sensitivity of these import-competing crops, a price band policy with price floors and 
ceilings might be an attractive option to evaluate. There is an ongoing debate in many 
countries over what might governments do to deal with the recent increase in 
volatility of commodity prices, especially of food prices. Governments could 
accumulate stocks during low-world-price periods and sell stocks during high-world 
price periods in order to reduce domestic price increases. But such an approach has 
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proven to be costly and usually unsustainable. Another more promising policy that 
does not require government control of stocks is to use a type of variable tariff based 
on moving averages of world prices. When world prices rise in short term, the tariffs 
would fall, cushioning the negative impacts on domestic buyers. When world prices 
fall, the tariffs would increase, cushioning the negative impacts on domestic 
producers. Such a possibility would have to be exceptional and administered with a 
credible commitment to focus this deviation from tariff uniformity on these few 
import-competing products only, with pre-established and transparent rules. Wheat 
and sugar are two possible candidates for this type of intervention to reduce price 
volatility. A price band policy, restricted to these two products, could be based on 
moving averages of border prices, and would have to be unrelated to domestic prices; 
otherwise, such a policy would fit the category of a variable levy, an instrument 
forbidden under the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO.2 The characteristics of 
Pakistan’s cotton sector would likely require a different approach. Cotton is an 
industrial input, not a food crop, and is an input into a successful export industry. 
Tariffs would not be relevant for reducing price volatility. A variable export tax is, in 
principle, a possible tool to counter volatility. When world prices would increase, an 
increased export tax on raw cotton would harm small cotton farmers, but benefit 
domestic industrial buyers, not poor urban consumers. When world prices would 
decrease, a lower export tax would indeed benefit small farmers, and harm large 
buyers to some degree. With the two import-competing food crops, when small 
farmers are prevented from taking advantage of high world prices, poor urban 
consumers are nevertheless protected, and vice versa. In the case of cotton, when 
small farmers do not benefit from high world prices, it is the industrial buyer who 
benefits. 
 
This asymmetry of the benefits of volatility reduction in the case of cotton suggests 
that a targeted approach to aiding small farmers, likely the most vulnerable, would be 
more appropriate. A possible volatility-reducing policy could be the use of option 
contracts that would put a price floor on the per-unit output value of a farmer’s sales. 
Support for covering the cost of put options contracts (in international commodity 
exchanges) could be targeted according to farm size. But the use of options contracts, 
which in principle are attractive, would require an institutional commitment on part 
of the Government to design and implement such a policy. It would be a challenge to 
coordinate thousands of small producers and to maintain a cost-efficient operation. 
 
 Because the fertilizer subsidy is a major driver of the ERPs and a significant fiscal 
cost, in parallel to the move toward reduced and uniform tariffs, the Government of 
Pakistan should consider eliminating this subsidy gradually. Before making radical 
                                                          
2 Variants of price bands have been used in several Latin American countries ostensibly to stabilize prices of 
importables between a moving floor and a ceiling, both of which typically are attained by adjusting tariffs 
annually according to moving averages of past world prices. This is done only with tariff adjustments, no storage 
schemes, and—to be WTO legal—cannot be based on domestic target price. For example, in Chile, where price 
bands started in early 1980s, the moving average for wheat was based on 60 months. Such a scheme implies a 
moving floor price level that would trigger tariff increases; and a moving price ceiling that would trigger a 
reduction or elimination of tariffs. The analytical justification of price bands has been based on stabilization per 
se rather than on the avoidance of extremely low price events. (For example in the case of Chilean sugar, there 
were periods in which the floor price in dollars exceeded the price ceilings in previous periods.) Price bands have 
been applied in Colombia, El Salvador, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. As applied in some countries, such as 
Colombia, the proliferation of the band policy to excessive number of products introduces much uncertainty and 
almost impossible management problems. 
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changes to the present fertilizer policy, however, one should evaluate the cost 
effectiveness of the present programs in terms of the opportunity costs of taxpayer 
funds, examining the possible impacts on fertilizer use across various products, on 
the use of other inputs, on per-acre yields, and on the income of farmers, especially of 
the small farmer.  
 
 Finally, with respect to exports, the recommendation would be to maintain the 
present system of low or no export taxes, and to eliminate all other quantitative 
restrictions on exports. One should note, however, that there might be political 
economy justifications for export restrictions. For instance, downstream industries 
could benefit from the reduced domestic price of the exportable commodities affected 
by the export restrictions. The case of cotton and textiles is a likely case. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Agriculture Trade and Price Policy in Pakistan 
9 
 
 
Brief Background: Structure &Performance of Pakistan’s Agricultural 
Sector3 
 
18. This policy paper focuses on the incentive framework for Pakistani agriculture, with 
emphasis on trade and price policies. The direct and indirect impacts of such policies are 
often underappreciated. Possible trade and price policies reforms, in the context of a highly 
tradable activity such as agriculture, by altering returns, would likely affect the performance 
of the whole sector by influencing the returns on infrastructure and other investments; and 
this in turn would have impacts on factor markets, such as for labor, land and water. 
Changes to the incentive structure due to changes in trade and price policies certainly would 
more directly affect the reallocation of labor, land and water to higher valued uses.  
 
19. The paper first presents a synthesis of the major trends in the performance of the 
sector in terms of production, employment and foreign exchange generation, the structural 
shifts within agriculture, changes in the output mix, the evolution of Pakistan’s net trade 
position in agriculture and food products, and other elements. This provides a broader 
context in which to view the functioning of agricultural trade and price policy, which is 
presented in the second section.  
 
20. The approach taken is to measure the impact of both explicit border measures and 
domestic price interventions. The effect of explicit border measures is addressed by a 
detailed analysis of the various tariffs and para-tariffs (and their exceptions). The effects of 
domestic interventions are addressed by a comparison of the border price equivalent at the 
farmgate level; that is by direct price comparison (adjusting for transport and other margins, 
quality differences etc.). As the reader will appreciate, Pakistan has an extraordinarily 
complex, opaque and discretionary, and continually changing trade regime, in addition to 
direct interventions by parastatals in procurement and sales price determination for the 
major crops. The paper presents a disaggregated analysis of the border measures for the 
selected products (trade and price interventions vary by product), and estimates the joint 
effect of trade and procurement policies on farm prices, captured by direct price comparison. 
Given the time and resource constraints, the project on which this paper is based did not 
undertake the difficult task of decomposing in quantitative terms the partial impacts of 
various parastatals, such as PASSCO and others, on farm prices, separating such impacts 
from other government policies and the perhaps uncompetitive behavior of local private 
traders.    
 
21. Agriculture contributes a substantial share of national GDP, approximately 21 
percent of national income, and the sector employs 45 percent of the total labor force. About 
two-thirds of Pakistan’s population resides in rural areas, and rural household primary 
depends on agriculture for their livelihoods. The average farm size is 3.1 hectares; but small 
farms (of about 1.4 hectares or fewer) make up 87 percent of all farms and cultivate 38 
                                                          
3 During the last three decades several important studies have been published covering the agricultural economy 
of Pakistan. With respect to agricultural trade and pricing policies, one should note the studies by Dorosh and 
Salam (2000), Hamid, Nabi and Nasim (1992), Dorosh and Valdes (1990), Pursell, Khan and Gulzer (2011), 
Amjad (2011), Chaudhry (2011),various reports by the Agricultural Policy Institute (API), Salam (2001), Orden, 
Salam, Dewina and Minot (2005) and Ahmad (2003). The latest study with measures of the effect of agricultural 
trade and price interventions covers the situation until 2004. Although unrelated directly to foreign trade, the 
World Bank study on Rural Factor Markets in Pakistan (2004) is relevant for understanding the underlying 
institutional issues and constraints affecting agricultural growth. 
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percent of all cropland. Large farms (of about 145 hectares or more) represent only 6% of all 
farms, but occupy 45 percent of total cultivated land. Beyond the farm gate, Pakistan’s 
agriculture is a major source of raw materials for the manufacturing industry, contributing 
over 50% of basic inputs to downstream industries. On the demand side, the sector is a large 
market for industrial products such as fertilizers, pesticides, machinery and equipment. 
 
22. Pakistan national accounts consider the agricultural sector to include crops, livestock, 
fishing and forestry. Currently, of the major cash crops, wheat contributes about 2.7 percent 
of total GDP, cotton 1.4 percent, rice 0.8 percent and sugarcane 0.9 percent. Oilseeds, pulses, 
potatoes, onions, chilies and garlic are other notable crops. Over the last two decades, with 
development and shifting consumption patterns, there has been structural shift within 
agriculture, the crop sub-sector gradually declining from 65 percent of agricultural value 
added in 1990-91 to 42 percent in 2010-11. Livestock’s share of agricultural value added 
increased from 30 percent to 55.1 percent over this period. Note that the other subsectors, 
fishing and forestry, have accounted for only 2.9 percent of the agriculture sector’s value 
added. 
 
23. Overall, the agricultural sector’s growth has declined gradually over the past three 
decades, as shown in Figure 1. In more recent years, changes in value added by subsector 
have been particularly more pronounced in case of crops, major and minor (Figure 2). And 
there is some evidence that agricultural growth has been slowing since early 2000s. The 
causality behind this decline is uncertain, but possible factors include the inequality in farm 
sizes, limited investment in irrigation systems, the slowing of adoption of new technology 
and techniques, a weak extension service, and perhaps the effect of changes to trade and 
price policies on agricultural investment.  
 
24. The variable performance of agriculture, especially of crops, depends on the weather 
and on the availability of irrigation water, which in turn is limited by infrastructure. An IMF 
study4confirms that rainfall has had a major impact on agricultural production, in part 
explaining the high year-to-year variability in output. Agricultural growth since the 1960s 
can be attributed in large part to the introduction of improved cereal varieties and increases 
in water availability due to investments in tube wells, canals and dams. In the past decade, 
however, there may have been a reversal in this trend, with limited investments in water 
storage and with sedimentation of existing reservoirs. The availability of irrigation water is 
highly variable, and not increasing (Figure 3), although demand from agricultural 
production should be rising. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4Pakistan: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix. 2005. International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
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Source: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Government of Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2010-11, Government of Pakistan 
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Note: The average availability of water in 2004-11 was 93.2 million acre feet. 
Source: Economic Survey of Pakistan 2010-11, Government of Pakistan. 
 
 
 
 
 
1995-1999 2005-2009 
Countries 
World Bank 
Income 
Classification 
Net Food 
Importer or 
Exporter 
Net Agricultural 
Importer or 
Exporter 
Net Food 
Importer or 
Exporter 
Net Agricultural 
Importer or 
Exporter 
Bangladesh Low NFIM NAIM NFIM NAIM 
India Lower middle NFEX NAEX NFEX NAEX 
Pakistan Lower middle NFIM NAIM NFIM NAIM 
Sri Lanka Lower middle NFIM NAEX NFIM NAEX 
Note: Food here is defined to include cereals, meats, dairy and eggs, edible oils and sugar. NFIM = Net Food Importer. NFEX 
= Net Food Exporter. NAIM = Net Agricultural Importer. NAEX = Net Agricultural Exporter. 
Source: Author’s computation based on FAOSTAT. 
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Source: Author’s calculations from Ministry of Commerce, Pakistan 
 
25. The major field crops—notably cotton, wheat, sugarcane, and rice—are the back bone 
of rural economy, and are sources of foreign exchange earnings for Pakistan. About 44 
percent of agricultural exports are due to rice and 20 percent due to wheat and cotton (see 
Figure 4). Leather, leather products and carpets account roughly for 4 percent of total 
exports. A rough estimate suggests that, over all, agriculture contributes to around 80 
percent of export earnings directly and indirectly through forward linkages to agro-based 
industries (such as textiles). The largest agricultural import is vegetable oil; other major 
imported agricultural products include long staple cotton, sugar, pulses, tea, milk and milk 
products. For 2010-11, the food group, textile group and agricultural & other chemicals 
group accounted for roughly US$ 14.2 billion of imports (35 percent of total). 
 
26. Despite the contribution to exports, Pakistan has been and remains both a net food 
importer and a net importer of agricultural goods (Table 1). As a direct source of foreign 
exchange, agriculture’s balance of trade has been negative during the period 1995-99 and the 
period 2005-09. For 2010-11, total agricultural imports amounted to approximately US$ 6 
billion and total agricultural exports amounted to approximately US$ 4.8 billion. To put 
these numbers into perspective, Pakistan’s total merchandise exports during 2010-11 
amounted to US$ 25.4 billion, and total imports to US$ 40.4 billion (Annex Table A1 
presents Pakistan’s main agricultural imports and Annex Table A2 the main agricultural 
exports for 2010-11). There is a notable concentration of both imports and exports in very 
few products. On the import side, sugar and palm oil made up almost 43 percent of all 
agricultural imports in 2010-11. On the export side, rice is by far the largest item, generating 
nearly half of agricultural export earnings. 
 
27. Although Pakistan is a net food importer, it would be unlikely that Pakistan would 
face a foreign exchange constraint in food imports, given the low share of such imports 
0
1000
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FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11
Others Vegetables Fruits Fish Rice
Pakistan Food Exports (US$ millions) by Selected Product Groups, 2004-11. Figure 4 
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relative to total export revenues and workers’ remittances. For example, workers’ 
remittances in 2009-10 were US$ 8.9 billion and US$ 11.2 billion in 2010-11. 
 
Trade and Pricing Policies related to Agriculture 
 
28. By 2003 Pakistan’s trade liberalization, which began in 1996, had simplified the tariff 
structure, nearly eliminating all quantitative restrictions, and lowering rates; and state 
trading monopolies were abolished for agricultural products. Beginning in 2006, however, 
exceptions were introduced, and—according to the IGC report of June 2011—there was a 
“reversal of a number of the more important liberalizing reforms in agriculture, notably of 
wheat, sugar and fertilizer policies.” In 2008 several Regulatory Duties were introduced, in 
addition to the expanded use of SROs—Statutory Regulatory Orders—which, since 2006, had 
been used to give both partial or full exemptions to normal tariffs, in some cases, and 
increased tariffs, in others. Tariff exemptions influence agriculture primarily through inputs; 
and most SROs are aimed at specified firms, not generally available for all importers. Such 
exemptions are yet another complication to a highly discretionary, and continually changing, 
trade regime, made all the more complex by preferential trade agreements (with China, Sri 
Lanka and other South Asian countries5). In addition to the uncertainty produced by the 
trade regime’s discretionary nature, the complexity of various tariffs, regulatory duties, and 
SROs, generates a variety of dispersed price impacts across both products and inputs, which 
in turn leads to a dispersion of effective rates of protection—that is, the incentives for 
resource allocation.  
 
29. In what follows the paper addresses the trade regime for four major agricultural 
products, which receive the most attention of government policy makers. It takes into 
account that simple customs duties—as reported, say, by the WTO—only tell a part of the 
story with respect to trade policies’ real impacts on incentives. The varied profile of tariffs 
and para-tariffs—SROs, regulatory duties, tax withholdings, export bans, and subsidies on 
some exports and inputs—requires an analysis at the product level that would capture the 
effect of the trade regime on returns. 
 
Import Taxes 
 
30. The trade regime has six basic types of taxes: 
 
1. The Customs Duty (CD), the standard tariff assessed on an import’s CIF value. 
2. A Regulatory Duty (RD), a special Federal Government border tax, which is 
applicable to the CIF value, applicable in some cases to exports. 
3. The Federal Excise Duty, FED, and the Special FED on CIF value. 
4. The Provincial Excise Duty (PED) on CIF value. 
5. The Sales Tax (ST) on the duty paid value. 
6. The Withholding Tax (WHT) on duty and the sales tax paid value. 
 
31. Note that withholding tax is an ‘advance tax’ charged at the time of import (or export) 
and subsequently is credited when traders file a final return to the tax authorities. The sales 
tax should be paid on transactions involving goods derived both from domestic and foreign 
                                                          
5There is also an agreement with India, but with bans on the import of several products 
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sources; and so conceptually should not be involved in calculations of protection of domestic 
products. There are various exemptions to taxes detailed by Special Regulatory Orders 
(SROs), which are particularly relevant for agriculture and discussed below in reference to 
the calculation of protection rates. SROs are the mechanism by which the Pakistan executive 
via the FBR can alter border taxes without recourse to the Parliament. SROs exempt many 
agricultural products, which are also exempt from sales taxes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
32. One should note the complexity of the border tax system as shown in the 
accompanying Box, and that the various taxes can vary by product, and can vary over time as 
executive regulatory decisions change. Moreover SROs can create exemptions, introducing 
even more possible dispersion both in nominal tariff rates and—even more difficult to 
anticipate—in the effective rates of protection. 
 
33. Turning to the actual values of border taxes, we first note that Pakistan’s customs 
duty framework has relatively high bound tariffs under the WTO but relatively moderate 
MFN applied tariffs (Table 2). Tariffs on agricultural goods have both a higher average 
bound tariff and a higher average MFN tariff, when simply summing over tariff lines, but 
averaging the MFN applied tariffs weighted by trade value, agricultural goods have a slightly 
lower MFN than non-agricultural goods, in part due to the number of tariff lines (mainly on 
edible oils) subject to specific duties and not an ad valorem rate. Again note that we are 
There are two ways to calculate rates of protection: comparisons of border prices (adjusted to the 
farmgate) and actual farm prices, and using information only at the border. To calculate the total rate of 
protection at the border, we employ the following simple formulas. Combining taxes 1, 2, 3 and 4 (these 
duties are levied on the CIF value of the product), one derives the “duty paid value” of the product by 
the importer: 
 
CIF + duties paid = CIF + CIF*CD + CIF*RD + CIF*FED + CIF*(Special FED) + CIF*PED =CIF (1 + CD + RD + 
FED + Special FED + PED) . 
 
The Sales Tax (ST) is applicable on the duty paid value, to yield the ‘sales tax paid value’:  
 
CIF + duties paid + sales taxes =CIF (1 + CD + RD + FED + Special FED + PED) (1 + ST) 
 
Transport costs are adjusted for in the direct price comparisons. Withholding Tax (WHT) is paid on the 
duty and sales tax paid value, to yield the ‘final tax paid value’: 
 
CIF + duties paid + sales taxes + withholding tax =CIF (1 + CD + RD + FED + Special FED + PED) (1 + ST) (1 + 
WHT). 
 
Note that tariff and tax exemptions are captured by this formula. To calculate an NRP at the border, for 
example, one would take the CIF price with duties and taxes relative to the CIF alone (which would 
result without interventions). That is 
 
 
 
NRP = (1 + CD + RD + FED + Special FED + PED) (1 + ST) (1 + WHT) – 1. 
 
 
     
                                               
   
  -    
How to Calculate the Total Rate of Protection at Border from Various Taxes Box 1 
Agriculture Trade and Price Policy in Pakistan 
16 
 
 
referring to MFN applied tariffs and not the true duties paid, which would include 
exemptions and other taxes. Note also, as seen in Table 3, that there are many tariff lines 
where the MFN applied is ‘duty free’ although the bulk of agricultural imports enter as tariff 
lines with duties in the range of 5% to 25%. Interestingly the bulk of non-agricultural imports 
enter as tariff lines with duties in the range of 0% to 10%. 
 
 
 
  
All Products Ag Non-Ag 
Simple average final bound 
 
59.9 95.6 54.6 
Simple average MFN applied 2010 13.9 17.0 13.4 
Trade weighted MFN applied average 2009 9.8 9.1 9.9 
Value of Imports in billion US$ 2009 31.7 4.2 27.5 
Source: Authors elaboration based on data from the World Trade Organization 
 
34. Table 4 shows a disaggregation of the average of MFN applied rates by tariff lines for 
various product groups. Note that, in terms of the share of total import value, agricultural 
goods make up about 13 percent, and that edible oils are by far the most important 
agricultural import. Within this product group, ‘oilseed, fats and oils,’ the lines entering 
MFN duty free are subject to specific duties. (In contrast, many petroleum products enter 
duty free with no specific duties.) With respect to basic foods, cereals make up only 1.4% of 
total imports, suggesting that food security as a matter of import capacity should not be a 
concern. Edible oils are the only food group of some significance. 
 
 
 
Frequency 
Distribution 
Duty-
free 
0 ≤ 
5 
5 ≤ 
10 
10 ≤ 
15 
15 ≤ 
25 
25 ≤ 
50 
50 ≤ 
100 
> 100 
Non ad 
valorem 
% of tariff lines or % of import value 
% of lines or 
value 
Agricultural products 
Final bound 
 
0 3.3 0 0.3 0.1 0.5 90.3 1.8 0.1 
MFN applied 2010 13.9 19.6 15.7 13.8 14.5 20.1 2.4 0 5 
Import value 2009 34.8 4.1 17.4 21.6 19.6 2.2 0.2 0 32.6 
Non-agricultural products 
Final bound 
 
0 1.9 0 1.8 14.9 18.3 62.3 0 0 
MFN applied 2010 5 38.4 13 6.7 31.6 4.9 0.3 0 0.1 
Import value 2009 36.1 25.3 18.7 3.8 11.8 2.7 1.7 0 0.9 
Note: The table shows counts of tariff items and an import value referring to the value of imports coming in under tariff 
lines with MFN rates within a specific range. But other taxes (and exemptions) and charges on imports might apply, so 
that imports coming in under a duty-free MFN could be subject to other para-tariffs. Non ad valorem refers to those items 
that could enter without an ad valorem tariff; for example, with a specific duty. Most notable non-ad-valorem products 
are edible oils. 
Source: Authors elaboration based on data from the World Trade Organization 
 
35. Many agricultural products, however, are exempt from both customs duties and sales 
taxes, as shown in Table 5. A more complete list and recent values of different taxes 
applicable to tradable agricultural products and inputs is found in Annex Tables A4 and A5. 
The use of SROs to exempt various goods from custom duties should be accounted for in 
estimating effective rates of protection. Using WTO MFN applied rates would tend to bias 
Summary of Pakistan’s MFN and WTO Bound Tariffs Table 2 
Summary of Pakistan MFN Applied Import Duty Ranges Table 3 
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the profile of relative incentives from the perspective of the impact of border measures on 
the value added of domestic industry as reflected in effective rates of protection. 
 
36. The impact of the trade regime on the estimate of the effective rate of protection for 
an industry and on the prices paid by individual importers depends on whether or not the 
importer of reference is eligible for certain exemptions. Consider the example of poultry, as 
illustrated by Pursell, Khan and Gulzar (2011).The final product, poultry meat, has an MFN 
customs duty of 25%, except from Sri Lanka with a tariff of zero, and from Malaysia with a 
tariff of 20% (prohibited from India). But many of the significant inputs in chicken 
production are exempted from duties (SRO 567), if their imports are authorized by the 
Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Livestock (MINFAL), as shown in Table 6. Note that for 
maize there is a preferential duty of 6.2% for imports from the SAFTA non-LDCs, except 
imports from India which pay an additional Regulatory Duty of 25% (for total duty of 31.2%). 
Soybean meal has the same SAFTA non-LDC preferential rate and this applies to imports 
from India as well.  
 
37. This poultry example illustrates well the complicated nature of Pakistan’s import 
policy, with its large number of different tariffs and para-tariffs, high apparent dispersion 
difficult to anticipate for specific products, highly discretionary, and an invitation to various 
lobbying groups to attempt persuasion, with the risk of encouraging corruption. In order to 
limit the imports of exempted goods, which otherwise would lead to the irrelevancy of the 
structure of customs duties, some degree of control must be exercised. The current system of 
formal tariffs with SRO exemptions and regulatory duties, is becoming a form of 
concessional rates and import licensing, something that should have been removed in past 
under the GATT-WTO Uruguay Round Agreement. Trade preferences are a different case, 
although their risk of trade diversion increases with the higher level and dispersion of the 
total rate of protection, including all sources of tariffs and taxes. 
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MFN applied duties Imports 
 
AVG Duty-free Max Share % Duty-free 
Product 
 in % of tariff 
lines 
 of total 
imports 
% of tariff lines 
Animal products 14.6 20.9 25 0.0 45.3 
Dairy products 30.0 0 35 0.2 0 
Fruit, vegetables, plants 18.2 12.2 70 1.9 73.1 
Coffee, tea 12.8 0 30 0.8 0 
Cereals & preparations 18.8 5.1 35 1.4 11.2 
Oilseeds, fats & oils 8.8 12.3 25 6.1 20.3 
Sugars and confectionery 17.2 0 35 0.6 0 
Beverages & tobacco 52.5 0 90 0.1 0 
Cotton 7.0 20.0 10 1.5 99.8 
Other agricultural products 6.7 28.9 30 0.7 49.3 
Subtotal agriculture    13.3  
Fish & fish products 10.6 0 20 0.0 0 
Minerals & metals 12.4 7.2 35 14.7 50.1 
Petroleum 10.7 36.1 25 26.0 71.0 
Chemicals 9.6 2.0 35 14.4 5.6 
Wood, paper, etc. 15.5 22.1 35 2.0 32.1 
Textiles 16.7 2.1 35 3.4 9.8 
Clothing 24.8 0 25 0.1 0 
Leather, footwear, etc. 14.9 26.7 35 1.2 38.4 
Non-electrical machinery 9.3 2.6 35 10.0 6.3 
Electrical machinery 14.7 0.8 35 7.9 17.5 
Transport equipment 24.7 2.1 100 4.7 24.3 
Manufactures, n.e.s. 13.1 1.8 35 2.3 6.2 
Note: These counts and shares reflect MFN duties only, and not effective rates finally applied, which differ due to SROs 
adjustments, regulatory duties, withholding taxes, and other possible changes. 
Source: Authors elaboration based on data from the World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Profile of Pakistan MFN Applied Import Duties by Product Group, 2010 Table 4 
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Customs duties Sales tax 
Withholding tax 
Product Statutory Applied Statutory Applied 
Wheat 10 0 16 0 5 
Cane sugar 25 0 16 0 5 
Milk 25 0 16 0 5 
Rice seed 0 0 16 0 5 
Rice seed 10 0 16 0 5 
Cotton not carded 0 0 16 0 5 
Cotton carded 5 0 16 0 5 
Farm equipment 5 0 16 0 5 
Insecticides 5 0 16 0 5 
Tractors 5 0 16 0 5 
Fertilizers 0 0 16 0 5 
Note: Duties and sale taxes of 0% actually applied are due to exemptions. This is more detailed than ‘applied’ tariffs as 
reported by the WTO. 
Source: Information gathered by author for the project 
 
 
 
Selected inputs 
Duties paid according to importer status 
Imports authorized 
by MINFAL 
All other 
importers 
Imports with preferential  
agreements 
Maize grain 0% 10 6.2 
Soybean meal 0% 10 6.2 
Vitamin B12 (feed grade) 0% 20 16.8 
Vitamin H2 (Biotin) (feed grade) 0% 20 16.8 
Fish Feed 0% 0% 20 16.8 
Poultry feed preparation 0% 20 16.8 
Growth promoter premix 0% 20 16.8 
Vitamin premix 0% 20 16.8 
Choline Chloride 0% 20 16.8 
Mineral premix 0% 20 16.8 
Source: Pursell, Khan and Gulzer, pp.45 
 
Export Policy 
 
38. Pakistan’s export policy introduces few restrictions to trade; the most important 
being bans on some ‘essential’ products ostensibly to ensure local availability and official 
approval for exports in some cases. Export commodities are not subject to export taxes, with 
some exceptions subject to regulatory duty: molasses has a regulatory duty of 15%, wheat 
flour (and other wheat products) is subject to 35% duty. Exporters are also required to pay a 
withholding tax of 1% of the sale proceeds, and commission agents pay 5% of commissions. 
Table 7 lists some important agricultural products and inputs and their export status. Note 
that rice dominates exports from Pakistan, but both wheat and cotton show large increases 
in exports during 2010-11. Note that wheat has been an import-competing crop historically. 
Basic Pakistan Custom Duties & Taxes (%) on Selected Agricultural Products, 2010 Table 5 
Tax Exemptions for Selected Inputs in Poultry Industry under SRO 567(I) of 2006 Table 6 
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Products Status 
Rice Exports subject to procedures of the Ministry of Commerce. Obligatory 
pre-shipment inspection by Quality Review Committee. Trade with 
Europe by the Trading Corporation of Pakistan which conducts PSI. 
Wheat Since 2011 exports of wheat freely allowed. 
Wheat, Flour, Suji and Maida Export is permissible in accordance with the Ministry of Commerce 
procedures. 
Sugar Banned for export, but in 2011, 100,000 MT allowed for exports, 
allocated on a first-come basis (5,000MT limit). 
Urea Banned for export except with the permission of Economic Coordination 
Committee (ECC) of the cabinet. 
DAP, NP, and other Fertilizers Banned for export. These products imported by UN and other relief 
agencies are permissible for re-export to Afghanistan. 
Cotton Exports subject to (a) registered contract with Trade Development 
Authority of Pakistan (TDAP) against 1% of the value of contract as 
security, (b) an irrevocable letter of credit with the TDAP to be opened 
within 35 days of the registration of the contract, the failure of which 
leads to the security deposit confiscated, and (c) exports shall be allowed 
against type as well as grade. 
Milk and Dairy Products Freely exportable. 
 
 
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives: Measuring nominal and effective 
protection for agriculture (2008-11) 
 
39. The cornerstone of agricultural policy reforms  in countries all  over the world is that 
the prices paid by farmers for inputs, and the prices paid for their products, should be 
similar to the real value of those goods or resources to the economy as a whole. That is, for 
products that can be traded internationally, they should pay and receive prices that are close 
to international prices for imports and exports, as well as for inputs and services. For this 
reason, as a counterfactual scenario, we focus on the effect of the prevailing policies in any 
given year relative to world prices (at the border) of outputs and tradable inputs (given the 
exchange rate). In this we do not address the question of whether or not there is some degree 
of misalignment in the exchange rate. 
 
40. There are essentially two types of support policies directed towards agriculture. The 
first are price interventions and government expenditures. These interventions are reflected 
in the difference between the domestic and the border price of a product of similar quality. 
This support, when positive, does not necessarily imply explicit government outlays. And 
when support is negative, referred to as taxation, it does not necessarily imply fiscal revenues 
are being earned by the government. Some government interventions imply transfers 
between some groups, sometimes explicitly from and to taxpayers to producers and 
consumers, but more often in the case of agriculture policies, transfers are implicit and flow 
between consumers and producers via distortions in prices.  
 
 
Pakistan Export Policies related to Selected Agricultural Products Table 7 
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41. The second type of support policies are government budget transfers or subsidies, at 
the national and regional level. These support policies include subsidies for capital 
investment, land improvements, direct payments and others, and do not directly affect prices 
received or paid by farmers. 
 
42. We examine two indicators that have been used to measure agricultural support in 
specific production activities in various country studies, the nominal rate of protection 
(NRP) and the effective rate of protection (ERP), which capture the direct effects of 
agricultural price and trade policies on the sector. The NRP is the simplest and most widely 
used indicator of the difference between the domestic and the border prices, measured by 
direct price comparison between the border and the farm gate price, in most cases expressed 
as the ad valorem ‘tariff-equivalent’ of tariffs, para-tariffs and non-tariffs barriers and 
subsidies. 
 
43. The NRP is the price received by producers,  relative to that price which would 
otherwise prevail in the absence of policy interventions. This hypothetical price would be 
equivalent to the border price, , times the exchange rate, . That is: 
 
 
 
Note: These prices should be ‘at the farmgate’—that is, the prices should account for 
domestic transport, marketing margins and quality differences.6 
 
44. The nominal rate accounts only for effects on producers prices received for product 
sales. And so another measure has been developed to more closely reflect the effects of policy 
on net income, which is, after all, the basis of farmer welfare. The ERP is the per-ton net 
returns to farmers relative to those returns which would otherwise prevail in the absence of 
policy interventions. The relevant comparisons are made using observed border prices (fob 
for exports and cif for imports) and hypothetical prices to represent the non-intervention 
case. 
 
45. The ERP measures the joint effects of trade barriers and price interventions on value 
added (returns to non-tradable factors, including land, labour and capital) via the impact of 
such intervention on both output and tradable input prices. Tradable inputs include agro-
chemicals, machinery and equipment, and fuel. In the absence of interventions, the ERPs 
would be approximately equal to zero. The calculations of ERPs require data on farm-level 
cost of production, in order to estimate the share of the cost of inputs in terms of output 
value. 
 
 
                                                          
6 Sometimes authors compute the NRP and the ERP based only on border interventions alone, without a direct 
price comparison of border and farmgate prices, adjusted for transport costs, quality etc. Direct price 
comparisons allow for the effects of quantitative restrictions, direct price interventions by local marketing 
agencies, and any other non-tariff policy driving a wedge between domestic and border prices. The NRP and ERP 
in this study using direct price comparison represent what economists call ‘ad valorem tariff equivalent’.   
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46. The ERP is calculated as the percentage difference between the value added per unit 
using the hypothetical farmgate prices (of outputs and inputs) without intervention (using 
border prices as in the NRP),  and the observed value added per unit, : 
 
 
47. The value added is a function of government interventions, such as tariffs, taxes and, 
importantly in the case of Pakistan, subsidies on fertilizer prices. 
 
48. In this study we focus on four activities, wheat and sugar as import-competing 
activities, and rice and cotton as exportables for the period between 2008 and 2011. In the 
case of cotton there has been some trade reversal (importable in some years and exportable 
in others). 
 
Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection in Agriculture 
 
Rice Basmati 
 
49. To determine the NRP on the product, we estimate the farmgate price of the product 
that would have otherwise prevailed in the absence of interventions. We compute the border 
price equivalent at the farm level by taking the FOB price and adjusting for port-and 
customs-related charges, observed wholesaler margins between mill and wholesale point, 
and millings costs (and quality adjustments, if they apply). The export marketing expenses 
include export and purchase incidentals as well as insurance and financial expenses as 
documented by the Agriculture Policy Institute (API).We are using the border price as the 
basis for the counterfactual. In the case of rice, there are no export taxes, but there may be 
implicit restrictions and even subsidies that drive a wedge between prices observed 
domestically and the border price. The observed wholesale price of rice is converted into a 
paddy-equivalent price using the standard paddy-to-rice conversion rate of 0.65. The 
wholesalers’ margin is calculated in rupees from the difference between the observed 
wholesale price (paddy equivalent) and the estimated price of paddy leaving the mill. The 
estimate mill gate price is simply the observed per-unit value at the farmgate plus estimated 
milling charges in rupees.  
 
50. Comparing the three years of interest, one observes fluctuations in both the border 
and farmgate price. The border price in US dollars was $1088/ton for 2008-09, $830 for 
2009-10 and $828 for 2010-11. The per-kilo prices in rupees at the border and at the 
farmgate were Rs 85 and Rs 19 in 2008-09, Rs 70 and Rs 24 in 2009-10, and Rs 70 and Rs 
28 in 2010-11. Note that in 2008-09, when world price were experiencing sharp increases, 
the farmgate price was at its lowest of the three years. Translating the border price into a 
farmgate equivalent leads to a NRP of –35 percent for 2008-09 and of –20 percent for 2009-
10. The NRP was positive 3 percent for 2010-11. 
 
51. To estimate the ERP, one must account for the effects of the trade regime on costs as 
well as output price. Tradable inputs for rice are fertilizer, agrochemicals, seed and 
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equipment and machinery.7 There are import tariffs on the tradable inputs and a fertilizer 
subsidy. We calculate a hypothetical input price by using the observed farm-level cost per 
unit, adjusting downward by removing the effective NRP rate (using the tariff and tax 
equation presented above) and, in the case of fertilizer, adjusting upward by removing the 
subsidy rate. For the tradable inputs, except fertilizer, the resulting hypothetical prices in the 
absence of the trade regime are lower in the order of 2% to 7%. The subsidy rate on fertilizer, 
however, is on the order of 35%, and, consequently, the costs per ton of production would 
increase considerably in the absence of intervention.  
 
52. The ERPs for the three years reflect the percent changes at the farm level in the value 
added over tradable costs per ton due to the removal of taxes and implicit barriers to export 
on product, the removal of tariffs and taxes on inputs, and the end of the fertilizer subsidy. 
As seen in Table 8, the implicit NRP on rice at the farm level was negative except for 2010-11 
when the farmgate price increased, although the border price equivalent at the farmgate did 
not. And despite the decrease in the implicit subsidy on tradable inputs, the increase in the 
farmgate price dominated, leading to a positive ERP for rice in 2010-11. The negative ERPs 
for the years 2008-09 and 2009-10, which represent a significant tax on production, are 
consistent with the large and negative Nominal Rates of Assistance (NRAs) estimated by 
Dorosh and Salam (2008) for basmati for the last two decades until 2005. Interestingly, 
Dorosh and Salam find positive NRAs for IRRI rice since 1995. Farm income, as measured by 
value added would have been 40% higher in 2008-09 under a no-intervention policy and 
21% in 2009-10. These implicit taxes should have had, all other things being equal, a 
significant impact on basmati rice production. These calculations suggest scrutiny of two 
contributors to the negative impact during 2008-10. The first is the barrier to exports 
reflected in the NRP at the farmgate. The second is the barrier to imports of tradable inputs. 
 
 
 
Item 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 
Border price per kilo US$ Karachi 1.09 0.83 0.82 
Exchange rate 78.5 83.8 85.5 
Marketing expenses Rs/kg 5.00 5.00 5.63 
Wholesale price Rs/kg 64.27 55.40 65.84 
Mill gate price Rs/kg 21.30 25.98 30.21 
Farmgate price per kilo   19.17 23.75 27.83 
Border price farmgate equivalent per kilo 29.69 29.68 27.08 
Implicit NRP on product at farmgate -35% -20% 3% 
Observed costs per kilo of tradable inputs 6.96 6.85 8.67 
Hypothetical costs per kilo of tradable inputs 9.18 8.27 10.03 
Implicit NRP on tradable inputs -24% -17% -14% 
Observed value added net of tradable inputs 12.21 16.90 19.16 
Hypothetical value added net of tradable input 20.51 21.41 17.06 
ERP -40% -21% 12% 
Source: Author’s Calculations (Details in Annex Table A5) 
 
 
 
                                                          
7The reader might note that there are possible additional interventions in the form of irrigation subsidies—mainly 
through energy subsidies—which are left unexamined in the following computations. 
Calculation of ERP for Basmati Rice from Punjab, 2008-10 Table 8 
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Wheat 
 
53. Punjab is the principal wheat province in Pakistan, growing 75% of total domestic 
production on average for the three years of study. Punjab data on costs of production using 
tradable inputs are used in order to calculate the nominal and effective rates of protection. 
As before, effective import tariffs on wheat and trade-able inputs are calculated using the tax 
equation presented above. Note that SRO 567 waives the customs duties and sales taxes for 
wheat, and therefore the price wedge between the border price and domestic price due to 
tariffs and taxes is small (2.82% for 2008-09 and 5.84% for 2009-10 and 2010-11). 
 
54. The NRP calculation compares the wholesale post-harvest price of Punjab (May–
June) with the import price, based on the CIF Karachi. The border price equivalent at the 
farm-gate is calculated by first calculating a border price equivalent at domestic wholesale in 
Karachi, which takes the CIF price plus import taxes plus charges related to letters of credit, 
port handling, and inland insurance. The border price equivalent at the farmgate is this 
wholesale price less the wholesaler margin. 
 
55. Table 9 shows the basic information to calculate the effective rates of protection for 
wheat as an import-competing activity for the three years of interest. Note that 2008-09 had 
a relatively high border price, which then fell substantially the following year, then to rise 
again in 2010-11, although not to its former peak. The wholesale price, however, remained 
stable. The farmgate price rose at about 11% per year in nominal terms, and about 6.3% per 
year in dollar terms. It is notable the large changes, and changes in sign, of the ERP, from—
20% to +13% to -23% over the three years. This is explained primarily by the swings in the 
implicit NRP on the product price, which was negative over the three years, but small in 
2009-10.  
 
56. The implicit NRP on tradable input costs was negative (in effect, a subsidy to 
farmers) and relatively stable compared to that on output price. This negative NRP on the 
input side is due to the fertilizer subsidy, the elimination of which would overwhelm the 
removal of tariffs and taxes on the inputs. In spite of the large volatility in border prices, both 
wholesale and farmgate appear to be relatively stable; which implies that government 
interventions, through Federal procurement targets of PASSCO and Provincial Food 
Departments, are absorbing the price transmission that would otherwise prevail in open 
markets. This price stabilization role is perhaps one reason that stocks have risen in the 
recent past, which lately has led to exports at subsidized prices. The negative ERP in 2008-
09 accompanies a subsidy to consumers via the ‘issue price’ of wheat at which the 
government releases grain to flour mills. During 2008-09 the cost of imported wheat was 
about Rs 26,000 per ton (not including handling charges and other costs, including 
significantly storage) while the issue price was Rs 18,750. Even ignoring additional costs, the 
implicitly subsidy to consumer—and the domestic price-suppressing effect to farmers—was 
at least 28%, that is Rs(26,000 – 18,750)/26,000. Including additional costs, API (2009) 
estimates that the total subsidy to consumers during this year just on wheat was Rs 50.3 
billion, or approximately US$ 650 million. 
 
Sugar  
 
57. Pakistan grows about million hectares of sugar cane and beets, and sugar represents 
the second largest agro-industry (following textiles). But domestic sugar production 
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fluctuates significantly and thus imports also. The NRP and ERP calculation are based on 
API parameters for sugar and sugarcane in the province of Punjab. The NRP calculation, as 
shown in Table 10, compares the observed farmgate price with the parity price of CIF 
Karachi refined sugar adjusted to its farmgate equivalent in Punjab. Import tax, margins, 
handling and transport costs are from the data shared by the Trade Corporation of Pakistan 
(TCP). 
 
 
Item 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 
Border price per ton US$ Karachi 330 261 304 
Exchange rate 78.5 83.8 85.5 
Wholesale price Rs/kg 22.93 22.55 23.18 
Farmgate price Rs/kg 16.46 18.67 20.26 
Border price farmgate equivalent Rs/kg 20.99 19.41 24.64 
Implicit NRP on product at farmgate -22% -4% -18% 
Observed costs per kilo of tradable inputs Rs/kg 9.50 10.05 11.23 
Hypothetical costs per kilo of tradable inputs Rs/kg 12.32 11.80 12.90 
Implicit NRP on tradable inputs -23% -15% -13% 
Observed value added net of tradable inputs Rs/kg 6.95 8.63 9.03 
Hypothetical value added net of tradable input Rs/kg 8.67 7.61 11.73 
ERP -20% 13% -23% 
Source: Author’s Calculations (Details in Annex Table A6) 
 
58. The significant increase in the world price of refined sugar increases the parity price, 
but the increase in the general sales tax applied to sugar offsets higher border prices. The 
NRP on sugarcane at the farmgate is negative and high—the parity prices are approximately 
double the observed farmgate price, which contrasts with positive and high NRP and NRA 
estimates at the wholesale level until 2004 (see Dorosh and Salam, 2008). One explanation 
for this contrast could be that support-price policy is not effective in practice. Indeed, the 
USDA GAIN report noted in 2010 that the decrease in sugarcane area and lower production 
during the last couple of years are attributed to the non-transparent government sugar 
policies, significant increase in minimum support prices for competing crops (e.g. wheat and 
rice), dwindling water resources, and higher input costs. Internal disputes between 
Pakistan’s sugar growers and processors also plague the industry. Procurement practices 
used by sugar processors such as delaying the crushing season, buying cane at less than the 
support price, and withholding payments hurt the farmers’ profitability. On the other hand, 
sugar processors complain that farmers grow unapproved varieties that produce low sucrose 
content resulting in lower sugar production and recovery rates. As a result of the fluctuations 
in quantity and quality of raw material, sugar mills have been required to operate at 50 
percent of their installed capacity. Furthermore, the lower sugarcane supplies have also 
forced most of the mills in cane producing areas to close 1-2 months earlier than normal. 
 
59. Note also the negative NRP for tradable inputs. Again, as in the case of the other 
products considered, the decrease in tradable input costs due to the fertilizer subsidy more 
than balances the increase due to tariffs. Despite the net subsidy on tradable inputs, the 
wedge between the parity price and farmgate price of the product results in a negative 
effective production—that is, an implicit tax on sugarcane production. 
 
 
Calculation of ERP for Wheat from Punjab, 2008-10 Table 9 
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2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 
(a) C&F Karachi US$/ton 510 679 739 
(b) Exchange rate Rs/US$ 78.5 83.8 85.5 
(c) C&F Rupees/ton [(a)*(b)] 40,034 56,890 63,179 
(d) Marine insurance/ton 493 701 778 
(e) Import value/ton [(c)+(d)] 40,527 57,591 63,957 
(f) Incidentals/ton  2528 3106 3322 
(g) Ex mill equivalent cost Rs/ton [(e)+(f)] 43,055 60,697 67,278 
(h) Processing cost /ton 6,071 6,796 8,072 
(i) General sales tax [(g)*20%] 7,860 11,474 12,810 
(j) Net value raw cane [(g)-(h)-(i)] 29,124 42,427 46,397 
(k) Recovery (11.22) [(j)/11.22] 2595 3780 4134 
(l) Parity price sugar farmgate cane 40kg [(k)/1000*40] 104 151 165 
(m) Molasses additional per 40 kg of cane 11 11 11 
(n) Parity price farmgate cane 40kgs [(l)+(m)] 115 162 176 
(A) Parity price farmgate per kg [(n)/40] 2.9 4.1 4.4 
(B) Farmgate per kg 1.5 1.73 2.39 
NRP product at farmgate [(A)/(B) – 1] -47% -57% -46% 
(C) Observed tradable input costs per kg 0.49 0.42 0.55 
(D) Hypothetical tradable input costs per kg 0.69 0.54 0.66 
NRP of tradable inputs at farmgate   [(C)/(D) – 1] -29% -21% -16% 
ERP   {[(B)-(C)]/[(A)-(D)] – 1}    -52% -63% -51% 
Note: For 2009/2010 some of parameters are from the API publication, “Presentation on Agriculture Policy Institute,” July 
2009. C&F Karachi is taken from the London average sugar price during year plus approximately 13% freight charges and 
other transport costs. General sales tax was 16% in 2008/09 and 17% in 2009/10 & 2010/11. 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
Cotton American 
 
60. Pakistan is the fourth largest producer of cotton in the world, and the rapidly-
growing domestic textile industry not only absorbs internal producer but has led to 
substantial imports of long-staple, high-quality cotton. The government places no tariffs or 
quantitative restrictions on cotton imports, although some taxes might apply to exports. 
Table 11 presents the estimated NRPs and ERPs for the three years of interest, as well as the 
basic information to compute these estimate. The farmgate information for seed cotton is for 
the province of Punjab, where most domestic production takes place. Ex-gin gate price was 
arrived at using ginning charges observed from API documents. The parity price of imports 
at the farmgate is derived from the US spot price equivalent for lint cotton in Karachi. 
Margins and marketing expenses are the Agriculture Policy Institute (API), Pakistan’s 
publications on Cotton Policy. The farmer produces seed cotton, which is ginned to produce 
lint and seeds, both of which should be taken into account in the process of comparing the 
international lint cotton price with the per-unit revenue of Pakistan farmers. The price of 
seed cotton is also likely influenced by import tariffs on vegetable oils, but this analysis did 
not examine what would happen if such tariffs were removed. Pakistan once exported much 
cotton, but today imports dominate, although they have declined recently (Table A1 and A2, 
and Table 11). In 2009 imported cotton lint amounted to US$ 615 million and exports 
amounted to US$ 83.5 million, or about 14% of export value.  
 
Calculation of ERP for Sugar, 2008-10 Table 10 
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61. Recently, international cotton prices have been highly volatile, but, although the 
border price has been volatile the reader should note that the domestic farmgate price has 
been more stable, drifting upward on average.  Between April of 2009 and December of 
2010, for example, the USDA quoted spot price of cotton lint rose from 55 cents to 168 cents 
per pound. Even between April of 2009 and April of 2010 the USDA spot quote increased 
about 60%, while the estimated farmgate price in Pakistan increased by only 16% in dollar 
terms between the two growing years. The farmgate parity prices would be therefore highly 
sensitive to the selection of the month in which we observe the relevant border price. Note 
that cotton imports are exempt from tariffs and border taxes, which raises the question, what 
might explain the wedge between farmgate and border equivalent prices, as reflected in the 
NRPs on the product in Table 12? Is it due to government intervention, monopolistic 
behavior of the textile industry, or a combination of internal market structure and policy? In 
any event the NRPs are volatile, with the NRP in 2009/10 being near zero (–3 percent), but 
in the other two years highly negative when world price were at high levels. Given the 
stability of the domestic price, this suggests that the cotton marketing chain or the 
government (or both) has been absorbing the recent volatility upward of world cotton prices.  
 
62. Again, as in other crops, the fertilizer subsidy is most influential in determining the 
NRP for tradable inputs. The cost of tradable inputs ranges from 11% to 21% less than what it 
would be in the absence of the subsidy but also without tariffs. Overall, the impact on 
farmers’ income as measured by the ERP is highly volatile because the border price is 
volatile. The ERP captures the effects on farmer income of a larger set of policies, which is 
hidden by simply examining the export or import parity prices as reflected in the NRP. As in 
the case of the other products examined, the impact of the trade regime and fertilizer 
subsidies on cotton reduces the negative impacts of the price wedge between the farmgate 
and the border. This border price wedge, however, could be very large and negative, as 
shown in the final column of Table 12, where the parity price using the December 2010 
USDA quote is more than double the farmgate price; and so the fertilizer subsidy does 
relatively little to compensate for this implicit tax. That a large proportion of Pakistan’s 
cotton growers are small farms raises complex questions of the political economy of best 
dealing with the efficient transmission of price signals in the context of such high price 
volatility. 
 
 
 
Year 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 
1000 MT 272.1 461.1 886.8 397.2 342.8 344.6 
Source: Federal Board of Revenue, Government of Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pakistan Imports of Cotton in 1,000 Metric Tons Table 11 
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 2008/9 2009/10 
2010/11 
Using April 
2010 
Using 
December 
2010 
(a) US cotton price US cents/pound spot April 75.41 55.34 88.09 168.22 
(b) Grade and staple discount US cents/pound 6.1 4.5 7.2 13.7 
(c) Discount inland transport US cents/pound 7.5 5.5 8.8 16.7 
(d) Parity price Karachi US cents/pound [(a)-(b)-(c)] 61.8 45.34 72.2 137.8 
(f) Or Rupees per 40kg [(d)*(e)/0.453592*40/100]  4277 3351 5442 10392 
(e) Exchange rate 78.50 83.8 85.50 85.50 
(g) Marketing expenses per 40kg 280 320 700 700 
(h) Ex-gin price lint 40kg [(f)-(g)] 3997 3031 4742 9485 
(i) Ex-gin value of 80kg cotton seed 1484 1854 1854 6482 
(j) Ginning charges for 120 kg seed cotton 350 500 500 500 
(k) Value of 120 kg seed cotton [(h)+(i)+(j)] 5131 4385 6096 15674 
(l) Seed cotton for 40 kg farmgate price 
[(k)/120*40] 1710 1462 2032 5225 
(A) Parity farmgate price seed cotton per kilo 
[(l)/40] 42.8 36.5 50.8 130.6 
(B) Farmgate Price 31.3 35.6 42.3 42.3 
NRP at farmgate for product [(B)/(A) – 1] -27% -3% -17% -68% 
(C) Observed tradable input costs per kg output 15 15 18 18 
(D) Hypothetical tradable input costs per kg output 19 18 20 20 
NRP at farmgate of tradable inputs [(C)/(D) – 1] -21% -15% -11% -11% 
ERP   {[(B)-(C)]/[(A)-(D)] – 1}    -32% 9% -20% -78% 
Note: For 2009/2010 some of parameters are from the API publication, Cotton Policy Analysis for 2009-10 Crop, June 2009. 
Average spot price in US for Upland cotton (color 41, leaf 4, staple 34) from USDA Market News. 
Source: Author’s Calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculation of NRPs and ERPs for Cotton, 2008-11 Table 12 
Agriculture Trade and Price Policy in Pakistan 
29 
 
 
Conclusion and Policy recommendations 
 
63. Pakistan’s agricultural sector contributes significantly to the country’s economic 
development both in terms of its growth and in terms of income generation for the rural poor 
and poverty reduction. About two-thirds of Pakistan’s population reside in rural areas and 
depend primarily on agriculture for its livelihood; overall, agriculture contributes 
approximately 21 percent of Pakistan’s national GDP, employing 45 percent of the total labor 
force. Beyond the farm gate, agriculture is a major source of raw materials for manufacturing 
industry, contributing over 50 percent of basic inputs to downstream industries. The major 
subsectors are livestock, cotton, wheat, sugarcane, and rice, serving as the back bone of rural 
economy and as sources of foreign exchange earnings for the country as a whole.  
 
64. Rice represents 44 percent of agricultural export earnings. Agricultural exports, 
however, amount to only approximately US$ 4.8 billion, a value that is relatively small 
compared to the size of the larger economy and to the importance of agriculture in total 
income generation. The total agricultural import bill by contrast is approximately US$ 6 
billion, the largest import being vegetable oils. 
 
65. Overall, the agricultural sector’s growth rate has declined gradually over the past 
three decades, with the most notable decline in output growth rates being in crops in spite of 
higher world prices during the late 2000s. The reasons for this slowing of growth are 
uncertain, but possible factors include limited investment in irrigation systems, the slowing 
of the adoption of new technologies, a weak extension service, and perhaps the effect of 
changes to trade and price policies on agricultural investment.  
 
66. Labor productivity in agriculture is below the average for the rest of the economy. 
The sector's labor share is much greater than its share in national value added implying that 
value added per worker in agriculture is very low. This observation further supports the 
policy recommendation below of reducing overall protection of tradables inputs for 
agriculture (reflected in the negative ERPs faced by some crops). 
 
67. By 2003 Pakistan’s agricultural trade liberalization had simplified the tariff structure, 
nearly eliminated all quantitative restrictions, lowered tariff rates, and ended state trading 
monopolies. But beginning in 2006, exceptions were introduced, and there was a reversal of 
a number of the more important liberalizing reforms in agriculture, notably related to wheat, 
sugar and fertilizer policies: the government introduced Regulatory Duties, expanded use of 
Statutory Regulatory Orders which manipulated normal tariffs. Tariff exemptions are 
important to agriculture, because they are primarily on inputs; most SROs are aimed at 
specific firms, and not generally available for all importers. Such exemptions are yet another 
complication to a highly discretionary, and continually-changing, trade regime, made all the 
more complex by preferential trade agreements (with  China and other South Asian 
countries). In addition to the uncertainty produced by the trade regime’s discretionary 
nature, the complexity of various tariffs, regulatory duties, and SROs, generates a variety of 
dispersed price impacts across both products and inputs, which in turn lead to a dispersion 
of effective rates of protection – that is, the incentives for resource allocation.  
 
68. One of the most obvious aspects of Pakistan’s import policy is its complicated nature:  
a varied profile of tariffs and para-tariffs – SROs, regulatory duties, tax withholdings, export 
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bans, and subsidies on some exports and inputs. With its large number of different tariffs 
and para-tariffs there is apparently a high effective dispersion to supports, which are difficult 
to anticipate for specific products. The import policy is highly discretionary, inviting various 
lobbying groups to attempt persuasion, with the risk of encouraging corruption. The current 
system of formal tariffs with SRO exemptions and regulatory duties, is becoming a form of 
concessional rates and import licensing, something that should have been removed under 
the GATT-WTO Uruguay Round Agreement. With respect to exports, Pakistan imposes few 
restrictions, the most important being bans on, or official approvals for, the export of some 
“essential” products ostensibly to ensure local availability. Export commodities are not 
subject to export taxes, with some exceptions subject to regulatory duties. 
 
69. This study presents estimates of nominal rates of protection (NRPs) and effective 
rates of protection (ERPs) at the farmgate for four products: wheat, rice, sugar and cotton. 
The border price equivalent of the products at the farm level is estimated using direct price 
comparison (FOB or CIF price), adjusting for port-and-customs-related charges and 
observed marketing margins. The NRPs for tradable inputs (fertilizer, agrochemicals, seeds 
and equipment and machinery) are estimated by taking observed costs per unit with and 
without border protection levels. In the case of fertilizer, the NRP also accounted for the 
input’s subsidy. The subsidy rate on fertilizer is on the order of 35 percent, and, 
consequently, the costs per ton of production would increase considerably in the absence of 
intervention. 
 
70. Overall, the ERPs for the four crops indicate an implicit tax on farm income, although 
there are some exceptions for some years. In the case of rice, the implicit NRP on the product 
at the farm level was negative except for 2010/11, when there was an increase in the observed 
farmgate price relative to the border price. The negative ERPs for rice for the years 2008/09 
and 2009/10 indicate that farm income, as measured by value added would have been 40 
percent higher in 2008/09 under a no-intervention policy and 21 percent higher in 2009/10. 
These implicit taxes should have had, all other things being equal, a significant impact in 
reducing basmati rice production.  
 
71. For wheat, the ERP fluctuated from -20 percent to +13 percent to -23 percent over 
the three years examined, explained primarily by the swings in the implicit NRP on the 
product price, which was negative over the three years, but small in 2009/10. The NRP on 
sugarcane at the farmgate is negative and high – the parity prices are approximately double 
the observed farmgate price. Again, as in the case of the other products considered, the 
decrease in tradable input costs in sugar production due to the fertilizer subsidy more than 
balances the increase due to tariffs. Despite the net subsidy on tradable inputs, the wedge 
between the parity price and the farmgate price of sugar results in a negative effective 
protection—that is, an implicit tax on sugarcane production.  
 
72. In the case of cotton, again the fertilizer subsidy dominates the NRP for tradable 
inputs, the cost of tradable inputs ranging from 11 to 21 percent less than what it would be in 
the absence of both the subsidy and the tariffs. Overall, the impact on cotton farmers’ income 
as measured by the ERP is highly volatile because the border price is volatile. As in the case 
of the other products examined, the impact of the trade regime and fertilizer subsidies on 
cotton reduces the negative impacts of the price wedge between the farmgate and the border. 
That a large proportion of Pakistan’s cotton growers are small farms raises complex 
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questions of the political economy of best dealing with the efficient transmission of price 
signals in the context of such high price volatility. 
 
73. One should note that even equal tariffs across various products will result in different 
rates of effective protection, because there is a variation in the cost shares of tradable inputs 
and because there are different levels of tariffs (and subsidies) across inputs. The only way to 
guarantee against major variations in effective protection rates—that is, returns over non 
tradables—is to make the rates of nominal protection uniform across all products, including 
raw materials, capital goods and other tradable inputs. When all nominal rates of protection 
are equal, all effective rates are equal to this nominal rate.  
 
74. Specific policy recommendations that follow from this study and previous 
experiences with trade-policy reforms: 
 
1. The aim of modifications of the tariff schedule should be toward greater equality, and 
a removal of what is effectively a tax on agriculture via tariffs and other explicit taxes, 
which this study has shown by the high and negative ERPs for wheat, cotton, basmati 
rice and sugar. 
 
2. From an examination of the current tariff and para-tariff regime, one observes a 
variety of instruments and a high degree of discretion: Pakistan should consider 
moving toward a uniform and low tariff, with the tariff as the only border measure, 
without exceptions and without other import taxes. A uniform tariff would not 
preclude sales taxes, as long as these are uniformly applied to imports and domestic 
production. Uniform tariffs, as the normal rule guiding trade policy, also would not 
preclude the prudent and occasional use of transparent contingency measures, such 
as safeguards, anti-dumping and countervailing duties, which are permissible tools 
under the WTO.8 
 
3. The estimates in this study show a volatility to protection (or effective tax) rates on 
the import-competing crops of cotton, wheat and sugar, due to the high volatility of 
prices in world markets. Given the political sensitivity of food crops—both with 
respect to the welfare of consumers and producers—a price band policy with price 
floors and ceiling might be an attractive option to evaluate. Such a possibility would 
have to be exceptional and administered with a credible commitment to focus this 
deviation from tariff uniformity on only these two products and with pre-established 
and transparent rules. A price band policy, restricted to these two products, could be 
based on moving averages of border prices, and would have to be unrelated to 
domestic prices; otherwise, such a policy would fall into the category of a variable 
levy, an instrument forbidden under the Uruguay Round of GATT/WTO.   
 
4. The study finds that the fertilizer subsidy is a basic driver of the effective rates of 
protection, offsetting the taxes on tradable inputs and the relatively low protection on 
outputs. But the fertilizer subsidy represents a significant fiscal cost, as well as an 
                                                          
8For a systematic discussion of the rules that apply to agriculture, with particular emphasis to South Asia, see 
Implication of the Uruguay Round Agreement for South Asia: The Case of Agriculture, edited by B. Blarel, G. 
Pursell and A. Valdes for the World Bank and the FAO. Although this publication is from 1999, the rules under 
the WTO have not since changed. 
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invitation to corruption.9 With the move toward the uniformity and the reduction of 
tariffs, the government of Pakistan should move to eliminate the fertilizer subsidy as 
well. But, the focus of this paper was not on the mechanics of fertilizer subsidy—in 
fact, the ERP approach does not incorporate substitution effects. Therefore, before 
making radical changes to the present fertilizer policy, one should evaluate the cost 
effectiveness of the present programs in terms of the opportunity costs of taxpayer 
funds, examining the possible impacts on fertilizer use across various products, on 
the use of other inputs, on per-acre yields, and on farm income, especially of the 
small farmer. 
 
5. Finally, with respect to exports, rice and cotton, the basic recommendation is to 
maintain the present system of low or no export taxes, and to move toward the 
elimination of all other quantitative restrictions on exports. One should note, 
however, that there might be political economy justifications for export restrictions. 
For instance, downstream industries could benefit from the reduced domestic price 
of the exportable commodities affected by the export restrictions. The case of cotton 
and textiles is a likely case. 
 
75. A summary recommendation here is to revise and consider an overhaul of the trade 
and price regime, to eliminate quantitative restrictions and to modify tariffs in the direction 
of greater equality, a positive, moderate and uniform tariff on imports across the board as 
the only border measure for import competing products. Some patterns of trade restrictions 
are far worse than others. The ERP approach shows that the same tariff on a final product 
can imply very different amounts of effective protection; a uniform nominal protection on all 
goods (including inputs) is the only way to guarantee against large variations in ERPs.  
 
76. As a final note, economists can always identify arguments in favor of preferential 
treatment for some activities; but in our judgment economic history provides ample evidence 
that in most cases the preferential treatment is captured by powerful lobbies, rather than by 
the sectors with the greatest growth potential. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9Over the last four years, the Pakistan government has provided total subsidies amounting to Rs. 110 billion on 
fertilizer, or averaging 27 billion per year (Ministry of Finance, Pakistan Economic Survey 2011-2012). Pakistan 
Today recently reported, "The government has spent around Rs. 45 billion as fertilizer subsidy during last 10 
months of the current fiscal year aimed at boosting agriculture and achieving its targets." On corruption charges 
related to the fertilizer subsidy, see, for example, “Fertilizer subsidy: Prime Minister urged to order probe into 
alleged fraud” in The Business Recorder, 13 January 2012. (http://www.brecorder.com/agriculture-a-
allied/183/1142139/) 
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Policy Matrix 
 
Objectives Short Term (1 year) Medium Term  
Enhance competitiveness 
of agricultural sector and 
reduce anti-export bias. 
Initiate trade policy reform that aims 
to reduce the dispersion and levels of 
tariffs and para-tariffs on imports, 
including tradable inputs. 
 
Advance towards eliminating export 
restrictions 
Move to a simplified tariff regime of 
uniform tariffs, no exemptions and no 
para-tariffs. 
 
Eliminate all export restrictions. 
Reduce fiscal costs Design a program of lowering fertilizer 
subsidies. 
 
Move toward eliminating fertilizer 
subsidies. 
Alleviate the problems of 
food price risk 
management.  
Evaluate the transitional use of 
adjustable-tariffs to effect price bands 
on wheat and sugar. Floor and ceiling 
prices to following moving average of 
world prices, with no domestic 
targeting.  
 
Simultaneously begin evaluation and 
design of cash-based safety-net 
policies to protect low income 
consumers from food price spikes. 
Implement the price band scheme for 
a period of up to 10 years.  
 
Begin a pilot targeted, cash-based 
safety-net program.  
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Annexure  
 
 
 
Rank Commodity Quantity (tons) Value (1000 $) Unit value ($/ton) 
1 Palm oil       1,943,894        2,012,411  1,035 
2 Wheat 8,901  5,158  579 
3 Cotton lint 344,599  976,654  2,834 
4 Dry Fruits 109,207  86,543  792 
5 Tea 119,792  334,141  2,789 
6 Spices 110,502  103,676  938 
7 Soybean oil 66,427  66,940  1,008 
8 Milk and Cream incl. Baby Food 64,947  165,762  2,552 
9 Sugar Refined 1,032,639  685,883  664 
10 Jute 93,141  71,542  768 
11 Pulses 627,093  401,509 640 
12 Rubber Crude 82,756 201,425           2,434  
Source: PBS 
 
 
 
Rank Commodity Quantity (tons) Value (1000 $) Unit value ($/ton) 
1 Rice Milled 3,657,507 2,118,156               579  
2 Fruits 655,335 274,674               419  
3 Seeds, Nuts & Kernels 17,351 18,475             1,065  
4 Vegetables 812,716 185,253               228  
5 Tobacco 6,685 26,249             3,927  
6 Cotton lint 142,313 309,587             2,175  
7 Meat and Meat Preparations 51,661 188,701             3,653  
8 Molasses 135,344 15,023               111  
9 Wheat 1,738,954 491,483               283  
10 Sugar 540 428               793  
11 Cotton carded, combed 23,001 156,238             6,793  
12 Spices 15,789 29,102             1,843  
Source: SBP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pakistan’s Main Agricultural Imports, 2010-11 Table A1 
Pakistan’s Main Agricultural Exports, 2010-11 Table A2 
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Import-competing commodities and seeds 
 
Wheat and seeds for wheat, 
sugarbeets, cotton and rice 
White Crystalline Cane Sugar 
 
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 
CD 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
FED 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Special FED 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
RD 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Provincial Excise Duties 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 
Discount by PTA/FTA 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
ST 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
WHT 2% 5% 5% 2% 5% 5% 
NRP 2.82% 5.84% 5.84% 3.84% 6.89% 6.89% 
 
Exportables 
 
Basmati Rice Cotton, American 
Tariff and taxes 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 
CD 10% 10% 10% 0% 0% 0% 
FED 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Special FED 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
RD 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Provincial Excise Duties 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 
Discount by PTA/FTA 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
ST 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
WHT 2% 5% 5% 2% 5% 5% 
NRP 13.02% 16.34% 16.34% 2.82% 5.84% 5.84% 
Note: The NRPs in this table are not from direct price comparisons between border and farmgate, but they have been 
calculated using only the information at the border. See the final equation defined in the box titled ‘How to calculate the 
total rate of protection from various taxes.’ 
Source: Pakistan Customs Tariff (Volume-I and II), Federal Board of Revenue, Government of Pakistan, various issues 
 
 
 
Tariff and taxes 
Fertilizer Pesticides/Weedicides &Machinery 
2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 2008-09 2009-10 2010-11 
CD 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
FED 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Special FED 0% 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 
RD 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Provincial Excise Duties 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 
Discount by PTA/FTA 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
ST 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
WHT 1% 1% 1% 2% 5% 5% 
NRP 1.81% 1.81% 1.81% 3.84% 6.89% 6.89% 
Import Tariffs & Taxes, Adjusted for Exemptions, Selected Agricultural Products, 2008-10 Table A3 
Import Tariffs & Taxes, Adjusted for Exemptions; Agricultural Inputs (Except Seeds) 2008-10 Table A4 
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Note: The NRPs in this table are not from direct price comparisons between border and farmgate, but they have been 
calculated using only the information at the border. See the final equation defined in the box titled ‘How to calculate the 
total rate of protection from various taxes.’ 
Source: Pakistan Customs Tariff (Volume-I and II), Federal Board of Revenue, Government of Pakistan, various issues 
 
 
 
Item Calculation/Explanation 
(a) Border price per kilo US$ Karachi f.o.b. price at Karachi Port 
(b) Exchange rate period average (Rs/US$) during each fiscal year 
(c) Marketing expenses Rs/kg 
export & purchase incidentals, insurance & 
financial expenses for each fiscal year 
(d) Wholesale price Rs/kg Source: PBS/provincial governments database 
(e) Mill gate price Rs/kg farmgate price of paddy plus milling costs 
(A) Farmgate price per kilo   
Cost of production of paddy at farm with land 
rent, Source: API 
(B) Border price farmgate equivalent per kilo 
[{(a)*(b)-(c)}*0.65-milling costs-{(d)*0.65-(e)}, 
0.65 is the standard paddy-to-rice conversion 
rate 
Implicit NRP on product at farmgate [(A)/(B) – 1] 
(C) Observed costs per kilo of tradable inputs Cost of all tradable inputs with interventions 
(D) Hypothetical costs per kilo of tradable inputs Cost of all tradable inputs without interventions 
Implicit NRP on tradable inputs [(C)/(D) – 1] 
(E) Observed value added net of tradable inputs 
Farmgate price- Cost of all tradable inputs with 
interventions 
(F) Hypothetical value added net of tradable input 
Border price farmgate equivalent- Cost of all 
tradable inputs without interventions 
ERP  [(E)/(F) – 1] 
Note: Hypothetical farmgate price is that which would prevail in the absence of interventions, and would correspond to the 
border price in rupees adjusted for marketing expenses, conversion ratio of paddy into rice, wholesale markup and milling 
costs. Tradable inputs include fertilizer, weedicides, seeds and machinery. "Observed" value added calculation takes into 
account actual tariffs and subsidies, etc. while “hypothetical” assumes no tariff and subsidies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculation of ERP for Basmati Rice from Punjab, 2008-10 Table A5 
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Item Explanation/Calculation 
(a) Border price per ton US$ Karachi c.i.f. price at Karachi Port 
(b) Exchange rate period average (Rs/US$) during each fiscal year 
(c) Wholesale price Rs/kg Source: PBS/provincial governments database 
(A) Farmgate price Rs/kg 
Cost of production at farm level, Source: API 
(B) Border price farmgate equivalent Rs/kg 
[{(a)*(b)}+Stevedoring, clearing, handling, 
wharfage, weightment, inland insurance, survey 
& pre-shipment charges and provision for 
unforeseen losses+LC opening charges, TCP 
commission & bank markup]-[(c)-(A)], Source: 
API, TCP 
Implicit NRP on product at farmgate [(A)/(B) – 1] 
(C) Observed costs per kilo of tradable inputs Rs/kg Cost of all tradable inputs with interventions 
(D) Hypothetical costs per kilo of tradable inputs Rs/kg Cost of all tradable inputs without interventions 
Implicit NRP on tradable inputs  [(C)/(D) – 1] 
(E) Observed value added net of tradable inputs Rs/kg 
Farmgate price-Cost of all tradable inputs with 
interventions 
(F) Hypothetical value added net of tradable input Rs/kg 
Border price farmgate equivalent-Cost of all 
tradable inputs without interventions 
ERP  [(E)/(F) – 1] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Calculation of ERP for Basmati rice from Punjab, 2008-10. Table A6 
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